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The social stratification systems of major cities are transforming all around the globe.
International research has been discussing this trend and focus on changing occupa-
tional classes. However, the precise effects on urban households, taking social welfare
and different family arrangements into account, as well as the precise effects on people
with a migration background, remain unclear. Using the example of Vienna, this article
examines immigration as a key dimension for social stratification. Although household
income structures in Austria have remained comparatively stable over the past two
decades, the middle‐income share in Vienna (as the sole metropolis in Austria) has dra-
matically decreased. This predominantly affects people from migrant backgrounds.
Using a comprehensive dataset (two waves, N = 16,700 participants, including
N = 4,500 migrants), we systematically examine the role of (a) migration‐specific and
(b) education‐ and employment‐related factors to explain the decline of middle‐income
migrants. The results of multinomial logistic regression and decomposition analyses sug-
gest that transformations in the labour market is the main driving force. Changing
migrant characteristics have counteracted this process. If today's migrants displayed
similar showed characteristics (e.g., origin and educational levels) to those prevalent in
the past decade, the ethnic stratification disparities would have been even stronger.
KEYWORDS
migration, shrinking middle class, social inequality, social stratification, Vienna1 | INTRODUCTION
One of the most debated issues in urban research is the continuing
social stratification transformation of cities due to the forces of
tertiarisation, globalisation, and demographic change (Burgers &
Musterd, 2002; Butler, 2003; Savage et al., 2013). The debate is centred
around a number of key theses. First, there is the polarisation thesis of
Friedmann (1986) and Sassen (1991). In Sassen's (2016) view, cities as
sites of production are increasingly exposed to new challenges, includ-
ing “a sharp rise in the demand for both high‐level talent and masses of
low‐wage workers. What it needs least are the traditional modest- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e Creative Commons Attribution Li
Published by John Wiley & Sons Lmiddle classes so central to the era when mass consumption was the
dominant logic.” This increase in employees among the top and bottom
occupational groups, along with a shrinking of occupational groups in
the middle, Sassen would argue, leads to a polarisation of social stratifi-
cation and a growing income gap between households. Second, authors
such as Butler, Hamnett, and Ramsden (2008), Tai (2006), or Hamnett
(2015) suggest that different cities present different scenarios in the
transformation of their social structures. “The argument in the London
context is that middle‐class growth or professionalization has been
the dominant process which has been linked with a decline in the size
of the traditional working class since the early 1960s. This argument- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 of 11 RIEDERER ET AL.has received empirical support in a number of other cities such as The
Randstad, New York, Paris, [Hong Kong], Singapore and Cape Town.”
(Hamnett, 2015: 240). In the context of this middle‐class expansion the-
sis, the changing social stratification of major cities can be described as
an “ongoing trend towards social upgrading …, a process in turn partly
fueled by an expansion of the middle classes within the city to incor-
porate greater numbers from lower professional and intermediate
non‐manual groups” (Cunningham & Savage, 2017: 26). A third thesis
takes the role of the state and the capacity of cities to govern economic
and social structural transformations into account. It stresses the contin-
ued significance of welfare and redistributive policies, and labour market
and educational programmes, at the local and regional levels. European
cities have retained distinctive governance features and relatively low
levels of social and spatial inequalities (Le Galès, 2002; Musterd &
Ostendorf, 2013).
The present paper is intended to contribute to this debate by
focusing on migrant middle classes and exploring why middle‐class
migrants have declined. This issue has not been addressed in the inter-
national literature using a systematic empirical analysis of large scale
datasets. Several studies highlight the need for further research into
the relationship between increasing immigration and ongoing changes
in urban social stratification (e.g., Bailey, van Gent, & Musterd, 2017;
Hamnett, 2015; May et al., 2007; Sassen, 1991; Watt, 2008).1 To this
end, we make exemplary use of a dataset on the living conditions of
the Viennese population in 2003 and 2013.2 This dataset is represen-
tative of the city's population. It includes a large sample of people from
migrant backgrounds (N = 4,500) displaying multiple characteristics
(e.g., nationality and language skills). Regression and decomposition
analyses are applied to examine the dataset. The focus is, first, on
the significance of migration‐specific characteristics for stratification
(e.g., national origin) and on whether the decline of middle class
migrants may be explained by changing migration flows and a resulting
variation in the composition of the migrant population. Second, we
examine changing education‐ and employment‐related factors in order
to capture their impact on the transformation of social stratification.
Vienna, as an important European metropolis, provides a reward-
ing case study. First, a structural change from the industrial to the ser-
vice‐based society has become particularly visible in this city.
Currently, 7% of gainfully employed persons are in the industrial sec-
tor and income differences are increasingly marked (Görgl, Helbich,
Matznetter, & Fassmann, 2011). Second, Vienna has experienced
strong population growth over the past two decades due to new
forms of immigration. As of January 1, 2017, almost half of the city's1Tai (2006: 1753) argues, for example, that “social polarisation in Singapore,
Hong Kong and Taipei occurs primarily in the external migrant labour market
rather than in the internal social structure [of the native population].” Similarly,
Watt (2008: 209) argues with regard to the lower social classes of London that
these “fractions include a new migrant ‘reserve army of labour’ doing many of
the city's socially invisible, often ‘dirty jobs’ (cleaning, caring, etc.); alongside
white and established Black and Asian groups who intermit over time between
routine employment (manual and non‐manual) and various forms of non‐
employment.”
2In a contextualising approach, we also applied EU‐SILC and Austrian
Microcensus data for the period of the last two decades.
3The figures on the sectoral mix and immigration are based on the Austrian
Microcensus (authors' calculations).population has migrant backgrounds (Manolakos, Luger, & Boztepe,
2017).3 Thirdly, the relatively stable stratification structure on the
national level in Austria is not mirrored in Vienna (Hatz, Kohlbacher,
& Reeger, 2016). Although internationally, Austria is virtually consid-
ered a “stronghold of stability”; the middle class share in Vienna has
shrunk. These developments hint towards “subsurface” dynamics that
have been given little attention in the international research to date.2 | THE TRANSFORMATION OF URBAN
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: KEY ARGUMENTS
AND SOCIOSPATIAL CONTEXT FOR THE
CITY OF VIENNA
In urban research, most studies that address questions of the transforma-
tion of social structures in cities apply data and analytical concepts which
focus on the changing occupational structure in a neo‐Weberian sense
(e.g., Boterman, Manting, & Musterd, 2018; Butler et al., 2008; Cunning-
ham & Savage, 2017; Hamnett, 2015; Sassen, 1991; Savage et al.,
2013).4 Most adopt the “Constant Flux” concept (Erikson & Goldthorpe,
1992) and omit those not employed (e.g., retirees, nonemployed mothers
and fathers, and unemployed persons). Depending on regions/countries,
this may omit 30% to 35%of the adult population.Moreover, such a con-
ceptualisation of social stratification obscures the structure of inequality
at the household level. This is typically shaped not only by one or two
earners' incomes but also bywelfare state interventions, private transfers
between households, and the numbers of persons living in households
(Atkinson & Brandolini, 2011; Western, Bloome, & Percheski, 2008). The
opportunities for an individual to access all income resources of the
household are crucial for that individual's position in a given society
(Mau & Verwiebe, 2010: 196). Investigations of the transformation of
urban social stratification at the level of household incomemay then con-
sider that household homogeneity is increasingly due to women's rising
employment rates and educational aspirations (Breen, Luijkx, Müller, &
Pollak, 2009; Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005).
With a view on Vienna, the following sections present various
operationalisations of urban social stratification.
Table 1 on the shifts in occupational classes within the past 20 years
not only confirms the findings of other studies but also shows that
social stratification has its own dynamics in Vienna. As in many major
cities, the class of professionals and managers has expanded substan-
tially over the past two decades.5 This is similar to the trends reported4A well‐integrated middle class is seen as a substantial feature of European soci-
eties (Mau & Verwiebe, 2010: 39). The middle class stands for steadily earned
incomes, civic involvement, sound family relationships, and social participation.
The expansion of this societal segment was inextricably linked to the economic
upturn after World War II, with the development of the welfare state and edu-
cational system, a process of democratisation, and the establishment of civil
society in Europe. However, social stratification research repeatedly shows that
in many countries, the middle class has come under increasing pressure over the
past years (Foster & Wolfson, 2010; Massari, Pittau, & Zelli, 2009; Whelan,
Russell, & Maître, 2016) that corresponds with substantial changes of the strat-
ification system and increasing social inequality (Alderson, Beckfield, & Nielsen,
2005; Atkinson & Brandolini, 2011).
5Average gross monthly wages in that class have increased as well (from € 3,500
in 2004 to € 4,600 in 2016; EU‐SILC, own calculations).
TABLE 1 Social stratification in Vienna based on occupational classes (1996–2017)
Higher class 1996 2003 2007 2010 2013 2017
Managers and professionals Austrian natives 25.7 26.5 24.9 25.4 34.5 36.7
Migrants 12.2 14.0 14.6 21.7 21.8 24.0
Total 23.4 24.0 22.9 24.6 31.5 33.0
Middle class 53.1 48.5 50.8 49.1 41.5 39.5
Technicians and associate professionals Austrian natives 17.7 19.9 24.1 24.6 21.4 21.8
Migrants 6.4 6.4 13.2 11.6 9.1 11.6
Total 15.8 17.3 22.0 21.8 18.5 18.8
Qualified white‐collar workers Austrian natives 20.5 17.4 15.9 15.7 12.1 10.5
Migrants 3.7 6.2 6.0 6.6 5.2 5.7
Total 17.6 15.2 14.0 13.8 10.4 9.1
Qualified manual workers Austrian natives 16.5 13.4 12.8 12.0 10.4 9.0
Migrants 35.0 26.8 23.0 18.8 19.9 17.6
Total 19.7 16.0 14.8 13.5 12.6 11.6
Lower classes 23.5 27.3 26.2 26.2 26.7 27.5
Routine service and sales workers Austrian natives 12.0 14.0 14.2 14.1 17.1 18.2
Migrants 12.2 15.4 17.9 18.2 24.4 22.6
Total 12.1 14.3 14.9 15.0 18.8 19.5
Unqualified manual workers Austrian natives 7.4 8.5 7.8 8.0 4.4 3.6
Migrants 30.6 31.2 25.3 23.1 19.4 18.5
Total 11.4 13.0 11.3 11.2 7.9 8.0
Note. Source: Austrian Microcensus; weighted analysis, own calculation; N = 25,325 (1996), N = 23,806 (2003), N = 23,278 (2007), N = 21,386 (2010),
N = 22,016 (2013), N = 22,611 (2017); migration status based on citizenship, class based on ISCO classification (first digits, collapsed).
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share of jobs in middle‐class positions has decreased over time from
53.1% to 39.5%. This is especially due to a substantial decline in quali-
fied white‐collar workers (1996: 17.6%; 2017: 9.1%) and manual
workers6 (1996: 19.7%; 2017: 11.6%) in the Viennese labour market.
Correspondingly, employment in lower‐class jobs grew from 23.5% in
1996 to 27.5% in 2017, mainly due to a massive increase in routine ser-
vice and sales jobs. Unqualified manual jobs declined as de‐
industrialisation continued.7 It is important to note that the dynamics
of social stratification vary substantially between natives and migrants
(Tai, 2006; Watt, 2008): The share of migrants in upper‐class and higher
middle‐class jobs is much lower than that of native Austrians. Instead,
migrants are overrepresented in qualified manual jobs (2017: 17.6%),
as well as in routine service/sales jobs (2017: 22.6%) and unqualified
manual work (2017: 18.5%). Thus, the migrant middle classes account
for only 35% of the jobs migrants hold in Vienna.
Table 2 illustrates the changing social stratification in Vienna using
equivalised household incomes that consider welfare transfers and
household size. These figures confirm that the dynamics of stratifica-
tion vary substantially between migrants and natives. The group of
migrants holding middle‐class positions in the income distribution in
Vienna shrunk considerably between 2004 and 2016, whereas the
share of middle‐class Austrian natives declined in a quite modest
way. This corresponds with a sharp rise in poverty among migrants
(2016: 40.5%), diminishing poverty among Austrian natives (2016:
10.9%), a rise of Austrian natives in the top income group (2016:
11.6%), and an increase in individuals deriving an income between6It is justified to classify qualified manual workers belonging to the middle class
in Austria: 95% of those workers are paid based on collective bargaining agree-
ments; thus, their average monthly salary (2016: € 2,200) mirrors the national
median salary (2016: € 2,250; EU‐SILC, own calculations).
7Workers in both classes have average monthly salaries (€ 1,500) clearly below
the national median monthly salary (EU‐SILC 2016, own calculations).60% and 80% of the national median income for both migrants
(2016: 25.0%) and Austrian natives (2016: 16.3%).
The spatial dynamics of changing social stratification (Boterman
et al., 2018; Davidson & Wyly, 2012) in Vienna corresponds with
the trends described above. Figure 1 displays the development of
the middle income class between 2003 and 2013 for four selected
housing types, characteristically located in different parts of the city:
(a) The historical centre of Vienna is characterised by high housing
density and many large, well equipped flats, often dating back to the
early 20th century. Regarding the income structure, the Austrian mid-
dle class (dark bar chart) was stable and slightly growing (2003: 41%,
2013: 43%), whereas the migrant middle class declined from 39% to
36% over this period. (b) The second housing type is large‐scale social
housing built after 1960 in the South and Northeast of the city, mostly
constructed by the municipality.8 This part of Vienna shows stability in
the share of Austrian middle class residents (2003: 48%, 2013: 47%)
and a decline for the migrant middle class from 39% in 2003 to 35%
in 2013. (c) Housing areas constructed between 1918 and 1960 typi-
cally have a lower housing density, as well as smaller flats. Figure 1
shows a decline of the middle class for both Austrian natives and
migrants: in 2013 less than 30% of migrants were middle class in this
housing sector (going hand in hand with a strong increase in poverty
among migrants in this area). (d) In the well‐equipped single‐family
houses located in the Eastern outskirts of Vienna, the share of Aus-
trian natives belonging to the middle class category rose substantially
between 2003 and 2013. This is evidence of a suburbanisation pro-
cess involving middle‐class individuals within the city. By contrast,
the share of middle‐class migrants in this part of the city declined con-
siderably. Overall, these trends confirm the spatial dynamics of chang-
ing stratification in Vienna. Middle income migrants are declining8Vienna is considered unique in its social housing policies: 40% of the popula-
tion live in publicly owned buildings (Austrian Microcensus, own calculations).
TABLE 2 Social stratification in Vienna and Austria based on
equivalised household incomes, 2004 to 2016 (in %)
Stratification: in percent of
national median income Vienna 2004 2016
Greater than 200%
(wealth)
Austrian natives 9.7 11.6
Migrants 2.7 2.3
Total 8.6 9.2





Austrian natives 46.1 44.5
Migrants 43.0 26.6
Total 45.6 39.9




(at risk of poverty)
Austrian natives 12.2 10.9
Migrants 30.6 40.5
Total 14.9 18.6
Note. Source: EU‐SILC, own calculations (weighted data); N = 13,049
(2016), N = 11,550 (2004); stratification calculated on basis of national
median incomes (equivalised household incomes). For instance, respon-
dents belong to the middle class if they earn 80% to 140% of the national
median income.
FIGURE 1 Shrinking of migrant middle class in urban areas
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seems to be spatial mobility among middle class Austrians: moving
from smaller apartments, constructed after World War I and II, to sin-
gle‐family housing at the Western periphery of the city.
Against this background, we want to analyse why middle migrants
have declined in Vienna. For the empirical analysis we include all individ-
uals (including those not integrated in the labour market) and welfare
transfers and household composition data. We also use income distribu-
tion data based on equivalised household incomes (Atkinson &
Brandolini, 2011) and include results from an analysis of changes in the
Viennese occupational structure in order to substantiate our findings.3 | CHANGING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN
VIENNA: POTENTIAL CAUSES OF DECLINE
FOR THE MIGRANT MIDDLE CLASS
The share of the middle class in Vienna has substantially shrunk over
the last two decades (regardless of the operationalisation of class
affiliation). Theoretical considerations to explain this decline typically
refer to migration‐specific, education‐ and employment‐related factors
RIEDERER ET AL. 5 of 11(Barone & van de Werfhorst, 2011; Boterman et al., 2018; Hamnett,
2015; Zimmermann, 2005).9 For example, migration‐specific factors
can include durations of stay and legal status (citizenship). Research
has argued that integration‐promoting factors have a positive impact
on one's position in the stratification system. Increasing lengths of stay
go hand in hand with improved acculturation and social‐network inte-
gration (Watt, 2008; Zimmermann, 2005). Likewise, the discontinuation
of legal obstacles, such as by acquiring citizenship, is considered to facil-
itate participation in the labour market (Kogan, 2003) and to ensure full
access to welfare benefits (Lohmann, 2009). For these reasons, the sec-
ond generation—migrants' children raised in Vienna—is expected to be
less frequently affected by social decline: an assumption which we will
test empirically. Second generation migrants generally hold Austrian
educational qualifications that provide favourable labour market posi-
tioning due to close connections between the training/educational sys-
tems and the labour market.
The migrants' countries of origin are equally relevant. The city's
population has grown since the 1990s due to increasing immigration.
Initially, such growth was driven by migrants from ex‐Yugoslavia and
Turkey (MA 23, 2017). However, with Austria's accession to the
European Union in 1995 and the EU eastward expansion in 2004/
2007 people from Germany, Poland, and Romania have constituted
the largest groups of migrants to come to Vienna (MA 23, 2017).
These migrants are better educated than both the “classic” labour
migrants of the 1960s and 1970s and the average native Viennese
population. The “classic” labour migrants, for example, Turkish and
ex‐Yugoslav groups, face risks of downward mobility in Vienna: their
incomes are approximately one third lower than the average as they
experience educational disadvantage and severe discrimination
(Sievers, Atac, & Schnell, 2014; Verwiebe, Seewann, Wolf, &
Hacioglu, 2016). On account of EU legislation, in turn, EU citizens
enjoy better access to the Austrian labour market and generate higher
average incomes than other migrants (Statistics Austria, 2015).Human
capital, as acquired by education and training, is paramount. Advanced
levels of education are associated with higher salaries and wages,
lower risks of temporary employment or unemployment, and reduced
poverty risks (Barone & van de Werfhorst, 2011). As social positions
are often “inherited” in Austria, education may offer migrants' chil-
dren the only opportunity to enter a higher social class than their par-
ents (Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004).10 International research has also
shown that it is essential for migrants to acquire the language of their
destination country. Communicative deficiencies impede the applica-
tion of otherwise available human capital (Esser, 2004; Guo, 2013;
Ours & Veenman, 2003).
In addition, the arrival of well trained new (EU) migrants has
resulted in a crowding out effect on earlier generations of less qualified9Other key dimensions are controlled for in the empirical analyses as well (Sec-
tion 5).
10Furthermore, lacking recognition to be granted with regard to educational
levels achieved in their countries of origin makes it difficult for the first genera-
tion to utilise their own human capital. Yet even though migrants with higher
levels of education still face lower risks of poverty and social decline than
migrants with lower levels of education, education protects migrants less effec-
tively from poverty than people without migrant backgrounds (Goebel, Grabka,
& Schröder, 2015; Guo, 2013).immigrant workers (Manolakos et al., 2017). Similarly, the social and
economic situation of migrants from the guest–worker generation has
deteriorated. This leads us to another key assumption. The decline of
middle class migrants has also been impacted upon by employment‐
related factors (McKernan & Ratcliffe, 2005).
Employment intensity (the extent of gainful employment), occupa-
tional positioning, and industry affiliation play important roles. The
guest workers of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as lowly skilled first
generation migrants in more recent years, are no longer employed in
comparably well paid industrial jobs in Vienna (Manolakos et al.,
2017). They more frequently find themselves in simple, poorly paid
services or in sectors marked by stagnating real wages (e.g., in the
hotel and restaurant industry; see also Table 1 in Section 2).11 Yet
the more recent and better qualified groups of migrants from the
EU‐15 are less affected: many of them are employed in well paying,
industry‐related service enterprises, international headquarters, or in
the Viennese banking sector. In addition, migrants are especially
affected in times of economic downturn (Lohmann, 2009) experienc-
ing an increase in unemployment throughout Europe over the most
recent economic crisis period (European Commission, 2016). This is a
development that has also been identified in Vienna. 40% of the
unemployed population in this city are foreign citizens (AMS, 2016).
Taken together, these developments support two main scenarios.
On one hand, the social decline of guest workers and other long‐term
migrants. On the other hand, the improved education levels and
income positions among more recent migrants, as well as the
improved education of second generation migrants trained in Austria.
The latter could have a positive and stabilising effect. The following
empirical analyses explore both scenarios.4 | DATABASE
4.1 | Data and variables
The data for our analyses were collected from May to October 2003
(N = 8,300) and from October 2012 to July 2013 (N = 8,400).12 These
are representative of the Viennese population aged 15 and above, and
include 2,081 migrants in 2003 and 2,490 in 2013. The estimates of
income class affiliation among foreign‐born individuals are only slightly
different from the results obtained with EU‐SILC data.13 In contrast to
EU‐SILC, the applied data on Vienna includes such characteristics as
national origin, citizenship, naturalisation, and language skills (for a
sample description, see S1, Table A.1).11Differences are pronounced between occupational groups and lines of busi-
ness in Austria. In particular, services in restaurants and hotels as well as in trade
are characterised by low‐wage employment. For instance, average gross hourly
wages amount to almost € 20 in manufacturing but less than € 12 in hospitality
or trade (EU‐SILC 2016, authors' calculations).
12Life and Quality of Life in Vienna (LLQW 2003) and Basic Social Science
Research for Vienna (SOWI 2013).
13For example, in 2013, the middle class comprised 32% (EU‐SILC: 30%), and
the lower middle and lower classes comprised 21% and 38%, respectively (EU‐
SILC: 21% and 36%, respectively).
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within the income distribution (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2011). Annually
available net household income, weighted according to the number of
adults and children in the respondent households, served as a starting
point. The Austria‐wide median was calculated on the basis of this
equivalised household income. Themiddle classwas defined for incomes
between 80% and 140% of the median income. The upper middle class
(140% to 200%) and upper class (more than 200%) are both above the
median income; the lower middle class (60 to 80%) and the lower class
(less than 60%) are both below the median income. A variety of charac-
teristics were drawn upon to scrutinise the respondents' migrant back-
grounds: The first generation included foreign‐born migrants, and the
second generation included immigrants' children born in Austria (with at
least one parent born abroad). National origin was based on the respon-
dents' own countries of birth (in the first generation) or those of their
parents (in the second generation) and comprised five categories: (a)
Turkey, (b) Ex‐Yugoslavia, (c) EU‐15 states, (d) other EU countries, and
(e) third countries. Citizenship was an additional differentiating factor
(Austrian by birth, by naturalisation, or other nationality).
Secondary school qualifications, language skills, income intensity,
occupational status, and industry affiliation were drawn upon to ascer-
tain education‐ and employment‐related factors. The highest levels of
completed education comprised four categories: (a) compulsory
schooling, (b) vocational training, (c) general or vocational high school,
and (d) university degrees. The language skills of migrants were
established with two questions: (a) Is your spoken German very good,
good, fair or poor, or don't you speak German? (b) Is your written Ger-
man very good, good, fair or poor, or don't you write in German?
(1 = very good, to 5 = don't speak/write German). The answers were
combined to categorise language skills as (a) very good in writing
and orally, (b) good in writing and orally (average 1.5 to 2.5), and (c) fair
to poor (average above 2.5). Employment intensity was captured as
either full‐time or part‐time (more/less than 36 hours a week). Non‐
employed respondents included unemployed individuals, retirees,
recipients of education (trainees, pupils, students), and others (those
on leave, househusbands/−wives, etc.). Occupational status
categorised freelancers, self‐employed individuals, low‐rank and mid-
dle‐rank employees, highly qualified employees, and skilled and
unskilled manual workers. Industry affiliation included (a) fishing, agri-
culture, and forestry, (b) trade (reference category), (c) hospitality
industry, (d) financial and economically oriented services, (e) public
administration, education, social services, (f) other service activities,
(g) manufacturing, (h) information and communication, and (i) electric-
ity, water supply, and construction.14In order to avoid difficulties due to unobserved variation, we followed the rec-
ommendation of Hoetker (2007) and tested the relationships between two
coefficients rather than single coefficients.
15This aggregation was considered to be sensible in view of the size of the sam-
ple, especially in an effort to avoid estimation problems with regard to affiliation
with upper classes. For example, the sample contains no unemployed migrants
affiliated with the two upper classes compared.
16Applying the KHB method, a test showed that the corresponding coefficients
(2003/2013) in Models A1 and A2 were significantly different both in terms of
affiliation with lower classes (b = −0.09; z = −2.99; p < 0.01) and with upper clas-
ses (b = 0.07; z = 2.87; p < 0.01) as compared with the middle class, respectively.
No such statistically significant differences were identified between Model A2
and Models A3 or A4.4.2 | Analytical strategy and methods
Various logistic and multinomial regression models were estimated to
explain affiliation with the middle class as well as lower and upper
classes. The tables in Section 5 present average marginal effects
resulting from these models, as these are most likely to be comparable
across different models (Best & Wolf, 2012).
The difference between migrants' class affiliations in 2003 and
2013 was initially examined using a pooled sample of both datasets.
This model first included a binary variable to capture the differencebetween 2003 and 2013 (Model A1). Migration‐specific and other
characteristics were then included in the Models A2 to A4. The KHB
method proposed by Karlson, Holm, and Breen (2012) was used to
test whether the established difference changed across the models.
Furthermore, decomposition analyses were applied to examine the
impact of changes in the migrant composition on the development
of Viennese social stratification. Employing the methods of Fairlie
(2006), Jann (2006), and of Sinning, Hahn, and Bauer (2008), results
for divergent variants and specifications were obtained (see S1, Table
A.3). Binomial models were primarily employed to differentiate
between affiliation with lower (below the middle class) and other
income classes (middle and higher classes). Separate models for
2003 and 2013 were calculated, and the method proposed by Allison
(1999) and Hoetker (2007) applied to test whether the coefficients
differed between the separately estimated models.14
Finally, one's position within the stratification system was with
the overall sample of 2013 in order to analyse differences between
natives and migrants while using further independent variables (lan-
guage skills, industry affiliation) exclusively retrieved in 2013. Here,
as well, binomial models were drawn upon.15 In a first step, differ-
ences between natives and first‐ and second‐generation migrants
were investigated (Model B1). Then, the KHB method was employed
to investigate whether the established differences would lessen once
other migration‐specific and other characteristics were included in
Models B2‐B4 (including gender, age, and family status).5 | RESULTS: EXPLAINING THE SHRINKING
OF THE MIGRANT MIDDLE CLASS IN VIENNA
Table 3 presents the results of the multinomial logistic regression
models as based on the pooled sample of people with migrant
backgrounds from 2003 to 2013. Model A1 confirmed the greater
likelihood of migrants' affiliation with a lower class in 2013 and their
lower likelihood of affiliation with middle or upper classes in 2003.
This difference was shown to be even larger in Models A2 to A4,
when further variables were included, than in Model A116: Accord-
ingly, if the migrant population had shown the same characteristics
in 2013 (e.g., origin, education, and gainful employment) as in 2003,
even more individuals would have been affiliated with the lower
classes.
A set of other relevant findings were also evident: The likelihood of
being affiliated with lower income groups was lower among second‐
TABLE 3 Differences in class affiliation among Viennese with migrant backgrounds
Affiliation with …
Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A4
AME AME AME AME
… lower classes
2013 compared with 2003 0.06**** 0.08**** 0.12**** 0.11****
Second generation, compared with first generation −0.12**** 0.00 −0.01 −0.01
National origin: compared with Turkey
successor states of Yugoslavia ‐‐ −0.25**** −0.20**** −0.18****
EU member states of 1995 ‐‐ −0.45**** −0.29**** −0.24****
other EU countries ‐‐ −0.38**** −0.26**** −0.21****
third countries ‐‐ −0.28**** −0.18**** −0.16****
Citizenship: compared with non‐Austrian
Austrian by naturalisation ‐‐ −0.04* −0.02 −0.03
Austrian by birth ‐‐ −0.09*** −0.06* −0.06*
… middle class
2013 compared with 2003 −0.03* −0.04*** −0.07**** −0.06****
Second generation, compared with first generation 0.09**** 0.01 0.01 0.00
National origin: compared with Turkey
successor states of Yugoslavia ‐‐ 0.20**** 0.15**** 0.14****
EU member states of 1995 ‐‐ 0.29**** 0.19**** 0.17****
other EU countries ‐‐ 0.27**** 0.18**** 0.15****
third countries ‐‐ 0.18**** 0.13**** 0.11****
Citizenship: compared with non‐Austrian
Austrian by naturalisation ‐‐ 0.02 0.00 0.00
Austrian by birth ‐‐ 0.07** 0.03 0.04
… upper classes
2013 compared with 2003 −0.03* −0.04**** −0.05**** −0.05****
Second generation, compared with first generation 0.03* −0.01 0.00 0.00
National origin: compared with Turkey
successor states of Yugoslavia ‐‐ 0.05**** 0.05*** 0.04**
EU member states of 1995 ‐‐ 0.16**** 0.10**** 0.08****
other EU countries ‐‐ 0.12**** 0.08**** 0.06****
third countries ‐‐ 0.10**** 0.06*** 0.05**
Citizenship: compared with non‐Austrian
Austrian by naturalisation ‐‐ 0.01 0.02* 0.02
Austrian by birth ‐‐ 0.02 0.02 0.02
Controls:
education, employment intensity, occupational status ‐‐ incl. incl.
family status, gender, age ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ incl.
Constant incl. incl. incl. incl.
Adj Count R2 3 9 20 25
Note. Source: LLQW 2003, SOWI 2013 (own calculations); N = 3,557. AME: average marginal effect.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001.
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ing our initial assumptions and the findings from other studies (Crul,
Schneider, & Lelie, 2012; Kristen & Granato, 2007). Country of origin
was a crucial factor in determining class and no differencewas observed
between the first and the second generation (cf. Model A1 and A2).17
Those from a Turkish migrant background were often allocated to the17A test based on the KBH method showed that the corresponding coefficient
(first/second generation) in Models A1 and A2 differed significantly, at least in
terms of affiliation with the lower classes (b = 0.50; z = −4.83; p < 0.001).lower classes, whereas those from the EU‐15 were most likely to be
affiliated with the upper classes (Verwiebe & Eder, 2006). Almost half
of the disadvantage experienced by Turkish immigrants (compared with
EU‐15/10migrants) can be explained by the EUmigrants' better educa-
tion and labour market position (compare Models A3 and A4 with
Model A2 inTable 3). For example, 25% of the EU‐10 and 35% of EU‐
15 migrants had a university degree in 2013, compared with 9% of
theTurkish group in which compulsory education still dominates (45%
of Turks). Although the effects of national origin lessened when includ-
ing education and other characteristics in the models (Models A3 and
TABLE 4 Affiliation with lower classes among Viennese with migrant backgrounds
Affiliation with a lower class 2003 2013 Decomposition
(below the middle class) AME AME 2003‐2013
Second generation, compared with first generation −0.04 0.01 .005
National origin: compared with Turkey
successor states of Yugoslavia −0.25**** −0.10** 0.019****
EU member states of 1995 −0.35**** −0.19****(b) −0.030****
other EU countries −0.29**** −0.17****(b) −0.021****
third countries −0.22**** −0.10** 0.007****
Citizenship: compared with non‐Austrian
Austrian by naturalisation −0.03 −0.02 0.002
Austrian by birth −0.02 −0.09**(a) −0.011**
Education: compared with compulsory schooling
apprenticeship, secondary school −0.09*** −0.03(a) 0.005**
high school −0.09*** −0.09** −0.006***
academic degree −0.17**** −0.18**** −0.019***
Employment intensity: compared with employed, full‐time
self‐employed, full‐time 0.00 −0.04 0.000
employed, part‐time 0.12*** 0.16**** 0.010****
self‐employed, part‐time 0.21** 0.08 0.002***
unemployed 0.29**** 0.44****(a) −0.006****
retiree 0.06* 0.08*** 0.007****
trainee, pupil, student 0.02 0.27**** −0.002*
other (e.g., on leave) 0.24**** 0.27**** −0.006****
Occupational status, compared with low‐ and middle‐rank employee
Freelancer 0.01 0.02 0.000
self‐employed 0.00 0.03 0.000
highly qualified employee −0.14**** −0.13**** −0.010****
skilled manual worker 0.11*** 0.06 −0.001**
unskilled manual worker 0.20**** 0.27**** −0.018****
other (including unknown) 0.14** 0.00 −0.001
Adj Count R2 41 36
N 1,644 1,913
Note. The binary logistic model shown here reflects multinomial Model A3 (see Table 3). The first two columns show average marginal effects (AMEs) for
respondents with migrant backgrounds for 2003 and 2013, respectively. An overall test for differences between years indicates that the two presented
models differ from each other (LR χ² = 32.53*). The right column gives results of a decomposition analysis. It was conducted employing the method
described by Fairlie (2006) and Jann (2006). The model obtained with the pooled sample was used as base model. In addition, the order of variables
was randomised. Ratio tests indicating differences between coefficients in 2003 and 2013: (a)p < 0.01; (b)p < 0.001. AME: average marginal effect. Source:
LLQW 2003, SOWI 2013 (own calculations); N = 3,557.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001.
8 of 11 RIEDERER ET AL.A4), differences continued to persist.18 This is a clear indication that
migration background per se is a key explanation for the dynamics of
social stratification in Vienna.19
Table 4 applies Model A3, including both migration‐specific and
education‐ and employment‐related factors, to further examine the
social stratification change among migrants. The table presents the
results of two separate regression models for 2003 and 2013. Another18As to affiliation with the lower and upper classes, tests (KHB method) yielded
several significant differences between the coefficients in Models A2 and A3
and Models A2 and A4.
19Following Atkinson and Brandolini (2011), and in order to substantiate our
findings, we calculated a number of sensitivity analyses using various other def-
initions of the middle class in the income distribution. The results confirm our
major findings discussed in Table 3.column summarises the results of a decomposition analysis. These
analyses focused on the issue of affiliation with classes below the mid-
dle of the income distribution.
Table 4 confirms the significance of national origin, with slightly
decreasing differences between the reference group of Turkish
migrants and all other groups. Natural‐born citizens with migrant back-
grounds were less frequently affiliated with the lower income groups in
2013 than had been the case in 2003 (see Herzog‐Punzenberger, 2017,
235). Likewise, education‐ and employment‐specific factors proved rel-
evant for the change in stratification among people from migrant back-
grounds in Vienna. Compared with 2003, for example, intermediate
qualifications were associated with lower classes in 2013. Higher edu-
cational levels continued to have a positive influence on class affiliation.
Our analyses also confirmed that employment intensity is a substantial
factor for stratification dynamics, and has gained in importance over
21Decomposition analyses with alternative measures of Viennese social stratifi-
cation and varying specifications confirm this key finding.
22Industrial affiliation had consequences, as expected: Unlike employment in
trade and the hospitality industry, employment in highly specialised fields, such
as financial and other economically oriented services, resulted in markedly
TABLE 5 Class affiliation in Vienna 2013 (people with and without
migrant backgrounds)
Affiliation with a lower class Model B1 B2 B3
(below the middle class) AME AME AME
Sample total total migrants
Migrant background: none ref. ref.
First generation 0.21**** .12**** ref.
Second generation .11**** .07**** .02
Language skills: mother tongue
is German
‐‐ ‐‐ ref.
very good in writing and orally ‐‐ ‐‐ .10**
good in writing and orally ‐‐ ‐‐ .13***
fair to poor ‐‐ ‐‐ .19****
unknown ‐‐ ‐‐ .06**
Industry affiliation (selection): Trade ‐‐ ref. ref.
hospitality industry ‐‐ .09* .10
fishing, agriculture and forestry ‐‐ .15* .10
financial and economically oriented
services
‐‐ −.14**** −.16**
other service activities ‐‐ .04 .06
Controls:




family status, gender, age ‐‐ incl. incl.
Adj. R2 4 28 43
N 6,523 6,523 1,861
Note. All models additionally include a constant term. Models B2 and B3
also control for affiliation with a number of other industries (see text).
AME: average marginal effect. Source: SOWI 2013 (own calculations).
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001.
RIEDERER ET AL. 9 of 11time. Unlike full‐time employees, the risks of lower income affiliation by
unemployed individuals and trainees had increased by 2013. Finally,
the findings regarding the relevance of occupational status for affilia-
tion in the stratification system corroborated our initially formulated
theoretical considerations. Unskilled workers from migrant back-
grounds ran a particularly high risk, which increased over time, of lower
class affiliation (Beyer, 2017).
Now, how relevant is the change in migrant composition in
Vienna to the transformation of its social stratification system?
The findings of our decomposition analyses, estimating a counter-
factual (“what if”) distribution of the income distribution and pre-
sented in the right column of Table 4, can be drawn upon to
address this issue. We refer to advantageous or disadvantageous
composition effects.20
Presenting selected and substantial findings, Table 4 (third
column) shows that the rise in the share of EU‐15 migrants and those20For example, with more university graduates in 2013 than in 2003, this com-
position of the population with migrant backgrounds should have had a positive
(beneficial) effect on the risks of being affiliated with lower groups of the strat-
ification system.from other EU countries has had an inequality‐reducing effect. Their
inflow to Vienna has subdued the increase in the lower income groups
and thus the associated shrinking of the migrant middle class. The
strong increase in the second generation of the migrant population
of this city, together with a growing share of well qualified and highly
educated migrants, has also resulted in a compositionally beneficial
development. Together, these developments have cushioned the
aggravation of poverty hazards and the shrinking of the middle class.
Moreover, in view of employment intensity, the increase in part‐time
employment caused accumulated poverty hazards over the period
under investigation. The increase in employment among highly
qualified employees and the decline in unskilled work between 2003
and 2013 attenuated the growth of lower income classes. In
sum, the change in the composition of the migrant population
would have had an inequality‐reducing effect. However, this was
counteracted by changes in the labour market‐related factors, as
discussed above.21
Table 5 summarises the results of other binomial logistic regres-
sion models. These models serve to explain the difference between
people with and without migrant backgrounds (and between the first
and second generations) in 2013. Again, people from migrant back-
grounds were more frequently allocated to lower income classes,
and especially first generation migrants (Model B1). Differences
between people with and without migrant backgrounds can to a lim-
ited extent be attributed to differences in education or industry affili-
ation (cf. Model B1 with Model B2).22 These differences lessened
once these characteristics were controlled for, yet remained statisti-
cally significant.23 The models and tests presented in Table A.4 (see
S1) also show that the effects of individual characteristics (education,
occupational status, gender, age, etc.) upon one's position within strati-
fication structures were comparable among people with and without
migrant backgrounds.24
Finally, Model B3 presents another separate model for individuals
from migrant backgrounds, taking into account language skills, among
others. Such skills were shown to be decisive factors in social
advancement, thus confirming findings from previous research (Esser,
2004; Ours & Veenman, 2003). The lower their language skills were,
the greater the likelihood of lower income affiliation. Differences
between the first and the second generation (or between Austrian cit-
izens and noncitizens) were no longer relevant after controlling for
language skills, as well as other factors, such as education,improved chances not to be allocated to classes of the income distribution
below the middle. The findings corroborated the theoretical argumentation in
Section 3.
23According to tests along the lines of the KHB method, the differences
between natives and the first/second generation were not as large in Model
A2 as in Model A1 (p < 0.001 in both cases).
24Other sensitivity analyses, using occupational classes based on the ISCO‐clas-
sification (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2011; Hamnett, 2015), confirm our major find-
ings discussed in Table 5 (see S1, Table A.6).
10 of 11 RIEDERER ET AL.occupational status, and trade.25 The intergenerational differences
may thus be explained by these factors.6 | CONCLUSION
International research has so far paid relatively little attention to migra-
tion as a key dimension of the transformation of the urban stratification
system. The present article has addressed this research gap by exploring
the decline of migrants from the middle of society in the city of Vienna.
Using a rich data source, we generated a number of important findings
which should be related to the three major theses on the transformation
of urban social stratification discussed in the theoretical part of our paper.
First, we showed that the stratification structure of the native popu-
lation is largely stable in Viennawhen using data on the household income
distribution which includes transfers from the welfare state. This corre-
sponds with a shrinking of the middle class within the occupational strat-
ification for Austrian natives. At the same time, the share of middle class
groups has clearly decreased among the migrant population (both within
the household income distribution and the occupational class system).
Second, an explanation for Vienna's complex social stratification
transformation cannot be based on just one theoretical proposition.
For example, our empirical findings clearly support key assumptions of
the polarisation thesis, especially if one focuses on the transformation
of migrant stratification. However, a key argument of the middle‐class
expansion thesis—referring to professionalisation tendencies within
the occupational class system of Austrian natives—applies to Vienna as
well. We would argue that our findings on social and spatial inequalities
support the “role of the state thesis” as well. This is evident from the
higher stability of themiddle classwithin the household income distribu-
tion and within large scale housing constructed by the municipality.
Third, turning to the micro logic of the transformation of Viennese
stratification, our analyses show that not only is migration‐specific
change responsible for a social decline among those from migrant
backgrounds, but so too are developments in education and employ-
ment‐related factors. Today, most migrants in Vienna are effectively
EU citizens who have noticeably higher educational levels than was
the case 20 years ago (MA 23, 2017). Our multivariate analyses illus-
trated that this finding is highly relevant for the development of social
stratification: The migrant middle class would have shrunk even more
had immigration not been Europeanised.26 However, this process was
counteracted by transformations in the labour market, including an
increase in part‐time employment and the loss of protection from
social decline for intermediate qualifications. Thus, a variety of dis-
placement effects are presumed to be developing in the labour mar-
ket. Furthermore, we showed factors such as education, occupation,25Tests based on the KHB method explicitly showed the difference between the
first and second generation to decrease if further variables are considered
(p < 0.001).
26Corresponding with migration literature, our results suggest that EU‐15/10
migrants are much better positioned in the Viennese stratification than Turkish
or ex‐Yugoslav migrants. This may largely be explained by their higher levels
of education, labour market integration, and language skills. Whether culture
(including religion, social skills, language) is additionally relevant has, however,
not been finally conclude with our available data (this could be a topic for fur-
ther research which considers that culture is correlated with both region of ori-
gin and education).gender, age, language skills, and industry affiliation to merely explain
a part of the differences between Austrian natives and migrants' class
affiliations. This is an important finding and gives rise to the issue of
discrimination in Vienna (Sievers et al., 2014).
In the end, one can assume that the decline of migrants from the
middle of Vienna's society is yet another example of an overall
European development. Migrants are among those most strongly
affected by the financial crisis in Europe (European Commission,
2016), and is also the case in Vienna, where almost 40% of all unem-
ployed individuals are foreign citizens and almost half of the popula-
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